with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication, including concepts and methodologies, 59 may be used by federal agencies even before the completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each 60 publication is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For 61 planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new 62 publications by NIST.
This public review includes a call for information on essential patent claims (claims whose use 121 would be required for compliance with the guidance or requirements in this Information 122
Technology Laboratory (ITL) draft publication). Such guidance and/or requirements may be 123 directly stated in this ITL Publication or by reference to another publication. This call also 124 includes disclosure, where known, of the existence of pending U.S. or foreign patent applications 125 relating to this ITL draft publication and of any relevant unexpired U.S. or foreign patents. 126 ITL may require from the patent holder, or a party authorized to make assurances on its behalf, 127
in written or electronic form, either: 128 a) assurance in the form of a general disclaimer to the effect that such party does not hold 129 and does not currently intend holding any essential patent claim(s); or 130 b) assurance that a license to such essential patent claim(s) will be made available to 131 applicants desiring to utilize the license for the purpose of complying with the guidance 132 or requirements in this ITL draft publication either: 133 i. under reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair 134 discrimination; or 135
ii. without compensation and under reasonable terms and conditions that are 136 demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination. 137
Such assurance shall indicate that the patent holder (or third party authorized to make assurances 138 on its behalf) will include in any documents transferring ownership of patents subject to the 139 assurance, provisions sufficient to ensure that the commitments in the assurance are binding on 140 the transferee, and that the transferee will similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of 141 future transfers with the goal of binding each successor-in-interest. 142
The assurance shall also indicate that it is intended to be binding on successors-in-interest 143 regardless of whether such provisions are included in the relevant transfer documents. 144 Such statements should be addressed to: ai-nccoe@nist.gov 145 This NIST Interagency/Internal Report (NISTIR) is intended as a step toward securing 170 applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially against adversarial manipulations of 171
Machine Learning (ML), by developing a taxonomy and terminology of Adversarial Machine 172
Learning (AML). AI refers to computer systems able to perform tasks that normally require 173
human intelligence, such as image classification and speech recognition. ML refers to the 174 components of AI systems that learn from data to perform such tasks. The ML components of an 175 AI system include the data, model, and processes for training, testing, and validation. Although 176 AI also includes various knowledge-based approaches, the data-driven approach of ML 177 introduces additional security challenges in training and testing (inference) phases of ML 178 operations. These security challenges include the potential for adversarial manipulation of 179 training data, and adversarial exploitation of model sensitivities to adversely affect the 180 performance of ML classification and regression. AML is concerned with the design of ML 181 algorithms that can resist security challenges, the study of the capabilities of attackers, and the 182 understanding of attack consequences [1] . Attacks are launched by adversaries with malevolent 183 intentions, and security of ML refers to defenses intended to prevent or mitigate the 184 consequences of such attacks. Although ML components may also be adversely affected by 185 various unintentional factors, such as design flaws or data biases, these factors are not intentional 186 adversarial attacks, and they are not within the scope of security addressed by the literature on 187
AML. 188
This document presents a taxonomy of concepts and defines terminology in the field of AML. 189
The taxonomy, built on and integrating previous AML survey works, is arranged in a conceptual 190 hierarchy that includes key types of attacks, defenses, and consequences. The terminology, 191 arranged in an alphabetical glossary, defines key terms associated with the security of the ML 192 components of an AI system. Taken together, the terminology and taxonomy are intended to 193 inform future standards and best practices for assessing and managing the security of ML 194 components, by establishing a common language and understanding of the rapidly developing 195 AML landscape. 196
The literature on AML uses various terms to characterize security and assurance, including 197 robustness and resilience. In cybersecurity more generally (NIST Glossary of Key Information 198
Security Terms, NISTIR 7298, Revision 2), robustness refers to reliable operation of a system 199 across a range of conditions (including attacks), and resilience refers to adaptable operations and 200 recovery from disruptions (including attacks). Also, in cybersecurity more generally (NIST 201 Glossary of Key Information Security Terms, NISTIR 7298, Revision 2), both robustness and 202 resilience are gauged by risk, which is a measure of the extent to which an entity (e.g., system) is 203 threatened by a potential circumstance or event (e.g., attack). Therefore, this general notion of 204 risk offers a useful approach for assessing and managing the security of ML components. 205
As introduced in the NIST Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments (NIST 800-30, Revision 1): 206
Risk assessment is one of the fundamental components of an organizational risk 207 management process... The purpose of risk assessments is to inform decision makers and 208 support risk responses by identifying: (i) relevant threats to organizations or threats 209 directed through organizations against other organizations; (ii) vulnerabilities both 210
internal and external to organizations; (iii) impact (i.e., harm) to organizations that may 211 occur given the potential for threats exploiting vulnerabilities; and (iv) likelihood that 212 harm will occur. 213
On that basis, a risk-based approach would begin by identifying relevant threats, vulnerabilities, 214 and impacts. In the case of AML, threats are defined by the types of attacks and adversarial 215 contexts in which attacks may occur; vulnerabilities are defined by the types of defenses, or lack 216 thereof, for preventing or mitigating attacks; and impacts are defined by the consequences that 217 result from attacks and associated defenses against those attacks. Therefore, the taxonomy of 218 AML here is aligned with these three dimensions of AML risk assessment, namely: attacks, 219 defenses, and consequences. 220
The taxonomy is presented below, by discussing key concepts in each dimension based on 221 reviews of other taxonomies and surveys of the AML literature. In the discussion, concepts 222 appearing in the taxonomy are written in title case italics. Because of rapid growth of concepts 223 and methods in this field, the intent is not to be exhaustive but rather to aid readers in 224 understanding relevant concepts pertaining to AML attacks, defenses, and consequences. Also, 225
while the taxonomy identifies attacks, defenses, and consequences from a risk-based perspective, 226 no attempt is made here to quantify the likelihoods and consequences that may arise from AML 227 attacks and defenses. 228
The taxonomy is followed by a glossary of terminology, including a stand-alone definition for 229 each individual term. This terminology was also extracted from existing literature and is intended 230 to complement the taxonomy by defining additional descriptive terms that do not appear 231 explicitly as headings in the taxonomy. Like the taxonomy, the terminology and definitions are 232 intended not to be exhaustive but rather to aid in understanding key concepts as discussed in 233 various other authors' reviews of the AML literature. 234
Taxonomy 235
The taxonomy is based on recently published papers that survey the AML literature and offer 236 taxonomies of attacks and defenses. More than a dozen such papers, identified via keyword 237 searches, were reviewed with the aim of identifying those themes and terms that appeared to be 238 most prevalent among authors. Special attention was paid to papers that provided lucid 239 explanations and recent compilations reflecting common if not consensus views across a number 240 of authors. The primary sources used here include: Akhtar (2018) [2] , Biggio (2018) [3] , 241
Chakraborty (2018) [4] , Liu (2018) [5] , and Papernot (2018) [6] . Additional sources used here 242 include: Kuznetsov (2019) [7] , Goodfellow (2018) [8] , Yuan (2019) [9] , Papernot (2017) [10] , 243
Papernot (2016) [11] , Huang (2011) [1] , Barreno (2010) [12] , and Barreno (2006) [13] . 244
The primary sources noted above treat topics in AML from different perspectives, with varying 245 degrees of breadth and depth. For example, Akhtar [2] , concerned with computer vision 246 applications, addresses attacks and defenses in that domain with greater depth than the other 247 authors noted above. Biggio [3] offers more of a historical perspective, tracing the evolution of 248 AML with a broader focus on computer vision and cybersecurity tasks. Charkraborty [4] , Liu 249 [5] , and Papernot (2018) [6] are all concerned with cataloging attacks and defenses with an even 250 broader focus independent of the specific area of application. Much overlap exists in these 251 papers, with authors often citing the same sources for the topics and terms they discuss. 252
This NISTIR is intended to capture common aspects of these previous papers surveying the field 253 of AML, in an integrated taxonomy adopting a risk-based perspective (see NIST Guide for 254
Conducting Risk Assessments, NIST 800-30, Revision 1) that applies across areas of application. 255
The highest levels of the resulting taxonomy include various aspects of Attacks and Defenses, as 256 illustrated by Figure 1 in the context of Training and Testing (Inference) phases of the machine 257 learning pipeline. Figure 2 organizes these and lower levels of the taxonomy in a hierarchical 258 fashion along the three dimensions of Attacks, Defenses, and Consequences. The third 259 dimension, Consequences, does not appear in the other taxonomies noted above and instead has 260
been addressed by other authors as an aspect of Attacks dealing with the adversary's intent. 261
A contribution here is to address Consequences as a separate dimension of risk, because 262
Consequences will depend on Defenses as well as Attacks, and because the actual or potential 263
Consequences of Attacks and Defenses may or may not be consistent with the adversary's intent. 264
As noted earlier, while we identify aspects of Consequences as well as Attacks and Defenses, we 265
do not attempt to quantify these individual dimensions of risk or overall risk. Indeed, we expect 266 risk will depend highly on the specific application context in which an ML component is 267 deployed. Nevertheless, our intent is to introduce a taxonomy (and associated terminology) of 268
AML in a manner that may support future efforts to assess and manage operational risks in 269 practical applications of ML. In Evasion Attacks, the adversary solves a constrained optimization problem to find a small input 387 perturbation that causes a large change in the loss function and results in output 388 misclassification. This typically involves Gradient-based search algorithms such as Limited-389 memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS), Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), 390
or Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA). L-BFGS was the first algorithm used to 391 generate misclassifications by a computer vision system model using input perturbations that 392
were imperceptible to human observers. FGSM improves the computational efficiency of 393 gradient ascent, in a Single Step approach that eliminates iterations required to obtain a 394 perturbation that will cause a large change in the loss function. Compared to FGSM, JSMA is an 395
Iterative Algorithm that provides more fine-grained control of perturbed features and thereby can 396 generate more convincing adversarial examples, albeit at increased computational cost. These 397 and other algorithms for Evasion Attacks require knowledge of the model, or a substitute model, 398
in order to compute gradients in the loss function across input-output pairings. Besides L-BFGS, 399
FGSM, and JSMA, many other techniques with similar operating principles have been developed 400
to generate adversarial examples [2] [4] [9] , one of which is depicted in Figure 3 [14] . Gradient-401 free attacks [15] have also been developed, but they typically require access to model confidence 402
values in order to be effective. 403 in Figure 4 , uses smoothing transformations of input features in an attempt to undo adversarial 459 perturbations [16] . Reformers take a given input and push it toward the closest example in the 460 training set, typically using neural networks called Autoencoders, to counter adversarial 461 perturbations. 462 463 Figure 4 . An example of Feature Squeezing, which smooths inputs to remove adversarial inputs [16] .
464
It is important to acknowledge that the adversary may defeat various Robustness Improvement 465
Defenses by launching Data Access or Oracle Attacks to obtain input-output pairings. These 466 pairings can be subsequently used to train a substitute model that does not mask gradients or 467 smooth outputs like the target model. The substitute model can then be used as a White Box to 468
craft adversarial examples, by exploiting the transferability property of ML-trained models, so it 469
can be difficult to defend against Evasion Attacks by an adversary capable of creating a 470 substitute model. 471
Besides the Robustness Improvements noted above, Defenses Against Testing (Inference) Attacks 472 also include randomization mechanisms applied to training data or model outputs to provide 473
Differential Privacy guarantees. Differential Privacy formulates privacy as a property satisfied 474 by a randomization mechanism on pairs of adjacent datasets. Ultimately, the Differential Privacy 475 property ensures that model outputs do not reveal any additional information about an individual 476 record included in the training data. However, there is an inherent performance tradeoff because 477 a model's prediction accuracy is degraded by the randomization mechanisms used to achieve 478 Differential Privacy. An alternative approach is Homomorphic Encryption, which encrypts data 479 in a form that a neural network can process without decrypting the data. This protects the privacy 480 of each individual input but introduces computational performance overhead and limits the set of 481 arithmetic operations to those supported by Homomorphic Encryption. 482
Consequences

483
The Consequences of Attacks against Targets depend on implemented Defenses. For a given 484 combination of Attack (including Target, Technique, and Knowledge) and Defense(s), the 485
Consequences can be characterized categorically as Violations of Integrity, Availability, 486
Confidentiality, or Privacy. Within each category, varying levels of severity may also be used to 487 measure the violation of security. 488
In Integrity Violations, the inference process is undermined, resulting in Confidence Reduction or 489
Misclassification to any class different from the original class. More specific misclassifications 490
include Targeted Misclassification of inputs to a specific target output class and Source-Target 491
Misclassification of a specific input to a specific target output class. In Unsupervised Learning, 492
an Integrity Violation may produce a meaningless representation of the input in an unsupervised 493 feature extractor. In Reinforcement Learning, an Integrity Violation may cause the learning agent 494
to act unintelligently or with degraded performance in its environment. 495
Availability Violations induce reductions in quality (such as inference speed) or access ( As a complement to the taxonomy discussed above, this section presents a glossary of 514 terminology with a stand-alone definition for each term. 515
Similar to the taxonomy, the terminology is based on recently published papers that survey the 516 AML literature as well as papers that address recent advances in the field. These papers were 517 reviewed with the aim of identifying those themes and terms that appeared to be most prevalent 518 among authors. The primary sources used here include: Akhtar (2018) [2] , Biggio (2018) [3] , 519
Chakraborty (2018) [4] , Liu (2018) [5] , and Papernot (2018) [6] . Additional sources used here 520 include: Kuznetsov (2019) [7] , Goodfellow (2018) [8] , Yuan (2019) [9] , Papernot (2017) [10] , 521
Papernot (2016) [11] , Huang (2011) [1] , Barreno (2010) [12] , and Barreno (2006) [13] . 522
Terminology definitions were constructed from the identified themes and terms. 523
The field of AI Security is currently heavily centered around AML, and much of the terminology 524 draws from the fields of ML. The goal and contribution of this NISTIR terminology is to 525 aggregate those terms that are in common usage in AML and use the sources to compile 526 common, standardized definitions. The guidelines for selecting terms for inclusion here are that 527 the terms are not general ML (e.g., deep learning) terms that are likely already defined in that 528 more general fields. Also excluded are terms that are specifically named and published 529 algorithms. In case of varying definitions, definitions were prioritized based on recency, 530 generality, and most common usage in source surveys. The references provided indicate one or 531 more possible sources of relevant information or the stated definition. They are not intended to 532 indicate specific endorsement or to assign originator credit. 533 
535
ID Term Synonym Assigned Definition Reference
1
Adversarial capabilities
The various actions, information, techniques or attack vectors available to an attacker on a threat surface.
[6]
2
Activation maximization
The synthetization of inputs that activate specific neurons in a neural network to produce synthetic inputs that are humaninterpretable.
3
Adversarial example transferability
The property that adversarial examples crafted to be misclassified by a model are likely to be misclassified by a different model. [6] 4 Adversarial example ML input sample formed by applying a small but intentionally worst-case perturbation (see adversarial perturbation) to a clean example, such that the perturbed input causes a learned model to output an incorrect answer.
[3], [2] 5
Adversarial perturbation
The noise added to an input sample to make it an adversarial example.
[2]
6
Adversarial training
Defensive method to increase model robustness by injecting adversarial examples into the training set.
[4]
7
Adversary
The agent who conducts or intends to conduct detrimental activities, perhaps by creating an adversarial example.
[2], [17] 8
Attack
Action targeting a learning system to cause malfunction.
[13]
9
Attack detection
The action of differentiating between anomalous and normal behavior, or between an adversarial example and a benign example.
10 Attack detector A mechanism to (only) detect if a sample is an adversarial.
11
Autoencoder attack
A perturbation attack on autoencoders that leads the autoencoder to reconstruct a completely different image. [2], [4] , [6] 13
Availability violation
A compromise of the normal system functionalities available to legitimate users, such as accuracy, quality, or access, resulting in inaccessible or unusable model output.
[3], [6] 14
Black-box attack
Zeroknowledge attack
Attack that assumes no knowledge about the model under attack. The adversary may use context or historical information to infer model vulnerability. The attacker may probe the system to inform system vulnerabilities.
[2], [6] , [4] 15
Causative attack Poisoning attack
See "Poisoning Attack." [13] 16
Confidence reduction
Reducing the confidence of prediction for the target model. For example, a legitimate image of a 'stop' sign can be predicted with a lower confidence having a lesser probability of class membership.
17
Confidentiality attack
An attack in which the adversarial goal is to reveal evidence of a model's characteristics or information about its training data.
[6], [3] 18
Data sanitization
Defensive method that identifies and treats manipulated samples as outliers in the training data, to be detected and removed.
[18], [3] 19
Dataset modification
Altering the training data directly, in contrast to injection.
20
Deep Contractive Network
An ML technique in which, for defensive purposes, a smoothness penalty is applied to reduce susceptibility to adversarial examples. It penalizes output [2] , [6] variation with respect to input variation to increase the variation needed to produce adversarial examples.
21
Defensive distillation
Distillation A procedure to train deep neural network (DNN)-based classifier models that are more robust to perturbations. Distillation extracts additional knowledge about training points as probability vectors produced by a DNN, which is fed back into the training regimen. Distillation generates smoother classifier models by reducing their sensitivity to input perturbations. These smoother DNN classifiers are found to be more resilient to adversarial samples and have improved class generalizability properties. A type of gradient masking.
[19], [4] 22
Dense evasion attack
L2-norm attack
Evasion (L2-norm) attack where the cost of modifying features is proportional to the distance between the original and modified sample in Euclidean space. The attacker will prefer to make small changes to many or all features.
[20]
23
Differential privacy
A mathematical formulation that defines the privacy provided by an ML model as the property that a learning algorithm's output will not differ statistically by the change of a single training example. This formulation is leveraged by multiple defenses that aim to protect data privacy.
[6], [5] NISTIR 8269 (DRAFT)
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Disinformation technique
Altering data seen by the adversary with the goal of confusing the adversary's estimate of the learner's state.
25
Distinguishability measure
A measurement of classifier robustness that describes the difference between classes of a dataset. Distinguishability is the distance between the means of two classes for linear classifiers and the distance between the matrices of second order moments for non-linear classifiers.
26
Distribution drift
A situation in which the training and test input distributions differ.
27
Enchanting attack
An attack on deep reinforcement learning in which the adversary lures the attacked system to a designated target state by integrating a generative model and a planning algorithm. The generative model is used for predicting the future states of the agent, whereas the planning algorithm generates the actions for luring it.
28
Ensemble learning or method
A classification method using multiple classifiers to enhance robustness including against evasion attacks.
[3], [21] 29
Error specificity
Describes the misclassification goal of an attacker: if the attacker aims to have a sample misclassified as a specific class, specificity is specific (targeted attack); if the attacker aims for any misclassification, specificity is generic (non-targeted attack).
[3]
NISTIR 8269 (DRAFT)
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Error-generic evasion attack
The attacker is interested in causing a misclassification of a test sample, regardless of the output class predicted by the classifier.
[3]
31
Error-generic poisoning attack
The attacker, using training set poisoning, aims to cause a denial of service, by inducing as many misclassifications as possible (regardless of the classes in which they occur).
32
Error-specific evasion attack
The attacker aims to mislead classification of a test sample, such that the adversarial samples are misclassified as a specific class.
33
Error-specific poisoning attack
The attacker, using training set poisoning, aims to cause specific types of misclassifications.
34
Evasion attack
The attacker manipulates input samples to evade (cause a misclassification) a trained classifier at test time.
35
Explainability
The ability to provide a humaninterpretable explanation for an ML prediction and produce insights about the causes of decisions, potentially to line up with human reasoning. [22] 36
Exploratory attack
The attacker manipulates only test data. Aims to cause misclassification with respect to adversarial samples (evasion) or to uncover sensitive information from training data and learning models (oracle).
[3], [5] 37
Fast Gradient Sign Method
An efficient method for computing an adversarial image perturbation, using the gradient [2] (FGSM) of the cost function. The image is perturbed to increase the loss of the classifier on the resulting image.
38
Fast-flipping attribute technique (attack)
An attack on facial recognition which imperceptibly modifies a single attribute to cause the face to be wrongly classified. Adversarial images are generated by flipping the binary decision of a deep neural network.
[2], [23] 39
Foveation Based Defense
An ML technique in which neural networks are applied to segments of images to improve robustness to adversarial patterns in the images.
40
Generative adversarial network
An ML technique which increases the effectiveness of a model generator by training it in the presence of an adversary-a discriminator which seeks to differentiate between real data and generated data. The effectiveness of the generator is measured by the error rate of the discriminator. Used in the generation of training data in an autoencoder attack or as a defense to train a more robust classifier.
41
Generative model An ML model trained with the goal of generating new data points. The model takes a training set, consisting of samples drawn from a distribution, and learns to represent an estimate of that distribution. As an attack, the generative model is trained to generate candidate adversarial samples.
[2], [8] , [5] 42
Generic specificity
Describes the goal of an attack as misclassifying a sample as any of the classes different from its true class. [3] 43
Gradient ascent
An iterative algorithm used to find a minimum of a function. Identifies the optimal adversarial inputs corresponding to local maxima in the test error of the model. Operates by calculating the gradient of objective functions that measure effectiveness.
[6], [4] , [5] 44 [6], [3] 45
Gray-box attack (grey-box attack)
Limited knowledge attack
Attack which assumes partial knowledge about the model under attack (e.g., type of features, or type of training data).
[2], [3] 46
Homomorphic encryption
A technique in which encrypted data can be processed by a neural network without decryption, allowing for data protection and improving data privacy when processed by an ML algorithm.
[6], [5] 47
Image perturbation
A change or transformation to an image, often to cause a misclassification.
48
Indiscriminate attack
An attack that aims to cause misclassification of any sample to target any system user or protected service.
[3], [5] 49
Inference
The stage of ML in which a model is applied to a task. For example, a classifier model [6] produces the classification of a test sample.
50
Injection (data injection) attack
The insertion of adversarial inputs into the existing training data. [6] 51
Input manipulation attack
A threat model that assumes the adversary can corrupt the input features of training samples or training sample labels. [6] 52
Integrity violation
To induce a particular output or behavior of the adversary's choosing. Compare against Confidentiality and Availability violations.
53
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
An attack that makes optimal miniscule changes to input data until the classifier is fooled or a maximum number of changes is met.
[2], [6] 54
L2-norm attack Dense evasion attack
See "Dense evasion attack."
55
Label manipulation attack
An attack in which the adversary corrupts the labels of training data.
[6], [4] 56
Label smoothing defense
A defense mechanism in which labels are changed from classes to real numbers, allowing for classification outside of the strict class labels.
[6], [4] 57
Limitedknowledge attack
Gray-box, or semi-black box
See "Gray-box attack."
58
Linearity hypothesis
The hypothesis that designs of DNNs that intentionally encourage linear behavior for computation efficiency, make them susceptible to cheaper [2] NISTIR 8269 (DRAFT)
A TAXONOMY AND TERMINOLOGY OF ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING 20 adversarial perturbations.
59
Logic corruption attack
An attack on an ML model in which the learning algorithm or logic itself is tampered with.
[6], [4] 60
Membership attack
An attack that targets the information of whether or not a given data point was part of the training dataset or part of the same distribution as the training dataset.
[6], [4] 61
Misclassification attack
Attack to alter the output classification of an input example to any class different from its true class. For example, a legitimate image of a 'stop' sign will be predicted as any other class different from the class of stop sign.
62
Model extraction attack
An exploratory attack that aims to discover the structure or parameters of the model by observing its predictions.
[6], [4] 63
Model inversion attack
An oracle attack that aims to discover training data and other sensitive data through knowledge of the model and auxiliary data.
64
Non-targeted attack
Untargeted attack
An attack that causes any misclassification as opposed to causing classification into a specific (incorrect) class. The predicted label of the adversarial example is irrelevant, as long as it is not the correct label. See also "Error specificity."
[2], [6] 65
Obfuscation attack
An attack against a targeted cluster of samples that attempts to generate a blend of adversarial samples and normal ones from other clusters without altering the clustering results of these normal samples, resulting in a set of stealthy adversarial samples. [5] 66
Obfuscation defense
A defense mechanism in which details of the model or training data are kept secret.
67 One Pixel Attack An (evasion) attack that alters a single pixel in an image to cause a misclassification.
68
One-shot/one-step method
Generates an adversarial perturbation by performing a single step computation, e.g. computing gradient of model loss once. The opposite are iterative methods that perform the same computation multiple times to get a single perturbation. The latter are often computationally expensive.
69
Oracle attack
An attack in which an adversary is able to craft inputs and receive outputs to the attacked model, in an attempt to learn information about the model and craft better attacks.
70
Output randomization
A defense randomizing the classifier's output to give imperfect feedback to the attacker.
71
Outsiders External users or adversaries that may be able to influence a system, not including enterprise users (consumers).
[6]
NISTIR [4], [5] 75
Privacy preserving model
A model that does not reveal personal details that may be included in its training data. [6] 76
Privacy violation
Revealing personal information about an individual included in the training data. [6] 77
Quantitative input influence
A measurement of the influence of certain inputs on model output.
78
Quasiimperceptible perturbation
Perturbation that impairs images very slightly for human perception.
79
Randomization defense
A defense mechanism that adds random noise to the training data, the model training cost function, the learned parameters, or model output to preserve privacy.
[3], [6] 80
Reactive defenses
Defenses that aim to counter past attacks, for example, by analysis of the target classifier, by timely detection of novel attacks, by frequent classifier retraining, or by verification of consistency of classifier decisions.
[3], [5] 81
Real-world attacks
Attacks successfully executed on existing systems.
82 Regularization A mechanism at training to improve generalizability of the model. It reduces model sensitivity or complexity, with the intent of limiting exploitability.
[6], [2] 83
Resilience "The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents." The ability of a system to adapt to and recover from adverse conditions. [25] 84
Robust learning
Learning algorithms based on robust statistics that are intrinsically less sensitive to outlying training samples. [3] 85
Robust optimization
Formulates adversarial learning as a mini-max problem in which the inner problem maximizes the training loss by manipulating the training points under worst-case, [3] bounded perturbations, while the outer problem trains the learning algorithm to minimize the corresponding worst-case training loss.
86
Robustness
The ability of an ML model/algorithm to maintain correct and reliable performance under different conditions (e.g., unseen, noisy, or adversarially manipulated data) [2] , [25] 87
Sample rejection defense
Defensive mechanism detecting and rejecting samples that are sufficiently far (as measured by a distance metric) from the training data in feature space. [3] 88
Security evaluation curve
Shows the extent to which the performance of a learning algorithm drops gracefully under attacks of increasing strength.
89
Source-target misclassification attack
An adversarial attempt to force the output of classification for a specific input to be a particular target class. For example, the input image of 'stop' sign will be predicted as a 'Speed Limit' sign by the classification model. [4] 90
Sparse evasion attack
Attack (using L1-norm) where cost depends on the number of modified features, and attacker aims to minimize the number of modified features. [20] 91
Specific error
Describes the goal of an attack as misclassifying a sample as a specific class.
92
Strategicallytimed attack
An attack on reinforcement learning in which the adversary attacks the model in a small subset of time steps to affect the The adversary tries to produce inputs that force the output of the classification model to be a specific target class. For example, any input image to the classification model will be predicted as a class of images having a 'Speed Limit' sign. See "Error specificity." [4] 96 Threat model Adversarial goals, knowledge, and capabilities that a system is designed to defend against.
[6], [3] , [4] 97
Training data extraction attack
An attack in which the goal is to discover parts or all of the training data.
98
Transferability of example
The ability of an adversarial example to remain effective even for the models other than the one used to generate it.
[2], [6] 99 Transparency Understanding the working logic of the model. [26] 100
Trust model A description of the level of trust assigned to various actors in a system deployment. Actors include data owners, system providers, service consumers, and outsiders who access or influence the system.
[6]
NISTIR 8269 (DRAFT) See "Perfect knowledge attack." [2] , [6] , [4] 104
Zero-knowledge attack
Black-box attack
See "Black-box attack". [3] 
